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We study a model of industry dynamics in which idiosyncratic risk is uninsurable and establishments
are subject to a financing constraint. We ask: does the model, when parameterized to match salient
characteristics of plant-level data (Colombia and South Korea), predict large aggregate TFP losses
from misallocation of factors across productive units? Our answer is: no. We estimate financing frictions
that are fairly large: one-half of the establishments in both countries are constrained and face an external
finance premium of 5% on average. Efficient establishments are, nonetheless, able to accumulate internal
funds and quickly grow out of their borrowing constraints. Parameterizations of the model that hinder
this process of internal accumulation can, in principle, cause very large TFP losses. Such parameterizations
are, however, at odds with important features of plant-level data, most notably the difference in returns
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Dierences in GDP per capita across countries are large and mostly accounted for by
dierences in total factor productivity: the eciency with which these countries' aggregate
stock of capital and labor is utilized. A key question in economic development is thus: what
accounts for the large disparity in aggregate productivity across nations? An intriguing
hypothesis1 is that an important source of dispersion in cross-country TFP are not simply
dierences in the eciency of individual productive units, but rather, dierences in the extent
to which the most ecient units in each of these countries can acquire the capital and labor
they need. According to this hypothesis, poor countries are poor not only because individual
establishments are less ecient, but also because those establishments that are ecient and
should operate at a higher scale are unable to do so.
A number of conjectures have been advanced to explain how countries may dier in the
extent of misallocation of factors of production. Popular among these are distortionary gov-
ernment policies2, frictions that distort factor mobility3, credit frictions4 or lack of insurance
against the risk associated with entrepreneurial activity5.
We study, in this paper, the role of credit constraints in generating aggregate TFP
losses. There is substantial evidence that nancial markets are much less developed in poorer
countries. For one, external nance is a much smaller share of GDP in developing economies,
suggesting that rms mostly rely on internal nance. Micro-level evidence shows that the
rates at which entrepreneurs can borrow in poor countries are large and dispersed6. Finally,
existing quantitative studies of the impact of nancing frictions on aggregate TFP generally
nd an important role for nance. For example, Jeong and Townsend (2006) attribute 70%
of Thailand's TFP growth from the 70s to the 90s to an improvement of the nancial sec-
tor. Amaral and Quintin (2005), Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2009), Moll (2009), Greenwood,
Sanchez and Wang (2009) provide careful quantitative estimates of the eect of nance on
misallocation. The TFP losses that these studies report are staggering: TFP would double if
one were to increase the access to external nance in poor countries to levels similar to those
1Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and Tybout (2000) review the evidence; Restuccia-Rogerson (2008), Hsieh
and Klenow (2008), Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2008) are several important recent contributions.
2Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2008), Guner,Ventura, Xu (2008)
3Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Lagos (2006).
4Banerjee and Duo (2005), Goldstein and Udry (1991), Jeong and Townsend (2006), to name a few.
5Banerjee and Duo (2005) and references therein. See also Angeletos (2008).
6See the survey in Banerjee and Duo (2005).
1in developed countries like US. For example, 80% of the TFP gap between US and Mexico
and 50% of the gap between US and Colombia is accounted for by nance frictions alone,
according to these studies.
Our goal in this paper is to use micro-level data in order to revisit the question of
whether nancial frictions distort resource allocation across productive units. We study,
through the lens of a model of rm dynamics with nancing frictions, plant-level data from
manufacturing rms in Korea and Colombia. We choose these two countries as these provide
us with relatively high quality micro-level data, but also because the two are at opposite ends
of the nance spectrum. Korea is a country with relatively well-functioning credit markets
with an external nance to GDP ratio greater than 150 % and thus similar to that of the
US, while Colombia has relatively poor credit markets and an external nance to GDP ratio
of around 30 %.
Our point of departure is the observation that `misallocation' is a statement about
dierences in rates of return to capital, labor and other factors across plants. An economy is
relatively more ecient at allocating resources if a highly productive plant is able to purchase
as much capital as needed so as to equate the returns to capital to that of a less productive
plant. In contrast, if nancing frictions are severe, highly productive rms are unable to raise
enough capital and thus have relatively high rates of return. The more severe the frictions are,
the larger the gap in returns to capital and other factors across productive and unproductive
plants, and hence the lower is aggregate TFP.
We therefore propose to measure the impact nance frictions have on resource alloca-
tion by explicitly requiring our model to account for salient features of the data on returns to
capital and other factors, in addition to other features of plant-level dynamics. This contrasts
to the approach in existing work where one mostly pins down the strength of the borrowing
frictions by relying on data on the size of the nancial sector. The latter, we argue, is not
sucient to pin down how severe nancing frictions are. Indeed, a country may have a low
external nance to GDP ratio because rms are severely nancially constrained. But a second
possibility is that rms in this country have little need for external nance, either because
there are fewer productive opportunities to nance, or because entrepreneurs are more risk-
averse and thus prefer to accumulate a suciently large stock of assets that permits them to
mostly rely on internal nance. In the latter scenario a low external nance to GDP ratio
is not necessarily evidence of more misallocation. Our goal is to distinguish between these
2two alternatives by using both micro-level data, together with aggregate data on the share
of nance to GDP.
The model we study is a standard model of industry dynamics in the spirit of Hopen-
hayn (1992). A continuum of plants dier in the eciency with which they operate. Eciency
uctuates over time, thus giving rise to micro-level dynamics and the need for external credit
to nance expansions. We assume, given the evidence in Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002), that entrepreneurial risk is not diversied and that dividends from the establishment
are the only source of income for risk-averse owners. Plant owners can trade a one-period
risk-free security, but the amount they can borrow is subject to a collateral constraint, as in
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
In addition to the amount of the collateral required for borrowing, several parameters
are crucial in determining the amount of misallocation that nancing frictions generate. The
more volatile and less persistent is a plant's productivity, the larger the need for external
nance and hence the stronger is the impact of borrowing frictions. A greater span-of-control
parameter magnies the losses from nance frictions. Finally, the rate of time-preference
(relative to the risk-free rate) plays an important role as well: the more patient plant owners
are, the more they save to avoid the possibility of a binding borrowing constraint, and thus
the less important nancing frictions are. We pin down all of these parameters by using data
on the volatility and persistence of establishment-level sales, the share of capital and variable
factors in total revenue, the aggregate debt-to-sales ratio in the manufacturing sectors of the
two countries we study, as well as several moments of the dispersion in returns to factors that
we describe next.
Our approach to measuring the severity of the collateral constraint is to recognize that
if rm dynamics is driven mostly by shocks to the eciency with which plants operate (or
by initial conditions for entering establishments that start with little wealth), then nance
frictions disproportionately aect establishments that expand rather than those that contract.
Establishments that expand need to acquire more capital and labor to nance the increase
in eciency and borrowing constraints are more likely to bind. If borrowing constraints are
severe such plants will have high returns to capital and other factors. In contrast, rms whose
eciency is worsening need to sell capital and labor and for them the borrowing constraint
is less likely to bind. These rms will have lower returns to capital and other factors. We
show that the model predicts that the worse the collateral constraints are, the larger the gap
3in rates of return for plants that expand vs. plants that shrink are and hence we use these
statistics to gauge the severity of the collateral constraint.
We briey summarize our ndings. We nd that nancing frictions are quite large,
both in Korea and Colombia. In both countries approximately one-half of the plants (more
than two-thirds of those that borrow) are nancially constrained. Agents in both countries
are willing to pay a 4-5% premium on external nance in order to relax the constraint.
The TFP losses from misallocation are however quite small, on the order of 2% for Korea
and, interestingly, only 1% for Colombia, reecting smaller variability in establishment-level
productivity in the latter. The reason we nd such small TFP losses is that we document
fairly small dierences in the returns to capital (27% Korea and 30% Colombia) and variable
factors (3% in both countries) across establishments that expand versus establishments that
shrink. The model thus interprets the smaller external nance to GDP ratio in Colombia
as evidence of not only more severe borrowing frictions (we nd that plants can borrow up
to 60% of their assets in Colombia, and up to 18% in Colombia), but also as evidence of a
stronger precautionary savings motive in Colombia. In contrast, if we were to attribute the
entire dierence in the external nance to GDP ratio between the two countries to dierences
in the size of borrowing constraints, we would nd substantially larger TFP losses, in the
neighborhood of 8%. Such a parametrization would, however, also imply a much larger gap
in returns to capital (56% vs. 27% in the data) and variable factors (15% vs. 3% in the data)
across establishments that expand and shrink.
In a similar vein, a model with more severe borrowing constraints than what we
estimate would overpredict the dierence in returns to factors for young plants (those that
start small and are growing much faster) versus older plants (that grow slower). A version
of our model with entry and exit accounts well for the growth-rate vs. age and returns to
capital/labor vs. age pattern in the data, statistics that have been argued useful in gauging
the extent of nancing frictions in earlier work7.
Our use of returns to capital and other factors to measure the severity of frictions is
not new to macroeconomists. This approach is related to that of the "gap" (between actual
and desired stock of, say, capital) approach to measuring adjustment costs in the work of
Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995) and others. Assuming a CES production function,
the gap between the desired and actual stock of capital is proportional to the returns to
7Cooley and Quadrini (2001).
4capital, and hence the two methodologies are related. In fact, adjustment costs also give rise
to a positive relationship between returns to capital and measures of rm growth. Hence our
approach of attributing all variation in returns to borrowing constraints will overstate the
importance of nance frictions.
That we nd little dispersion in returns to capital and other factors may seem to
contradict the ndings of Hsieh and Klenow (2008) who nd large unconditional variability
in these returns using plant-level data for China and India. The dierence between our results
lies in the fact that we project measures of return to factors on measures of rm dynamics
in order to isolate the role of intertemporal distortions. Thus, although we do nd large
cross-sectional dispersion in returns to factors (which may arise for a variety of reasons), we
nd small dierences in returns once we condition on measures of rm growth. The latter
conditional measures must be large for nancing frictions to play an important role.
In addition to studying the TFP losses induced by nance frictions in a cross-section,
we also briey study the model's predictions for TFP in the aftermath of a nancial crisis.
In particular, Korea experienced a severe nancial crisis in 1997 that was associated with a
9% increase in corporate bond spreads, a 70% exchange rate devaluation, as well as a 3.3%8
drop in utilization-adjusted TFP relative to trend. When we feed the model a reduction
in establishments' net worth large enough so as to generate the 9% increase in the external
nance premium we observe in the data, we nd that the model accounts for the bulk of the
increase in the cross-sectional dispersion of returns to factors in Korea in the aftermath of
the crisis. Moreover, the model generates a TFP decline of 2%, thus roughly sixty percent of
the TFP drop in the data. Thus a crisis of large proportion produces a fairly small eect on
TFP, both in the model and the data.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses the ap-
proach we use to identify the strength of nancing frictions. Section 3 describes the data for
Korea and Colombia and discusses its salient features. Section 4 studies the data through
the lens of the model and computes the TFP losses from misallocation. Section 5 conducts a
number of additional experiments to gauge the robustness of our results and also allows for
plant-level turnover. Section 6 studies the Korean nancial crisis.
8Benjamin and Meza (2009)
52. Model
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of entrepreneurs, each of whom has access
to a technology that produces output using a constant returns to scale production func-
tion. Each entrepreneur produces a variety of imperfectly substitutable goods and faces a
downward-sloping demand curve. Dividends from the plant are the sole source of income for
the entrepreneur. Because our focus is on aggregate TFP losses in the ergodic steady-state
of a small open economy with no aggregate uncertainty, we conduct our analysis in a partial
equilibrium setup. The general equilibrium extension is straightforward but requires addi-
tional notation and does not add much insights. We abstract from plant-level turnover at
this point, and return to a variation of the model that allow for plant exit and entry below.
A. Environment





where Dt are the rm dividends, the only source of the owner's income. We assume U(D) =
D1 
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 > 0: Plants produce output Yt using inputs of capital, Kt, and a composite





9, and operate under a Cobb-Douglas production






We assume that plant productivity grows over time at rate g and deviations around this trend
follow an AR(1) process with serial correlation :
log(At)   gt = [log(At 1)   g (t   1)] + "t
9We collapse thus the problem into 2 dimensions given that the choice of M vs. L is static and can be
optimized out. Clearly, optimization implies V = pM +wL, where pM is expenditure on intermediate inputs
and wL is the labor bill.





The entrepreneur owns the plant's capital stock, Kt; and decides how much to invest and
how much of the variable factor to hire in each period. Capital depreciates at rate : Letting
 = 1 + 1








 + (1   )Kt 1   Vt   Kt
We next describe the assumptions we make regarding the nancial side of the model.
First, we assume that the plant owner cannot issue equity and so the bond is its only source
of nance. Second, we assume that the entrepreneur must pay its workers, suppliers of capital
and intermdiate inputs upfront, before receiving the revenue from sales, but after repaying
its outstanding debt. In other words, we assume that proceeds from selling the good are
received with a one period delay. As a result, the choice of both capital and variable factors
are intertemporal and aected by the nancial frictions.
We allow the plant owner to borrow and lend at an interest rate r using a one-period
risk-free security. Let Bt 1 be the amount of debt the plant owes at the beginning of period
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We assume  (1 + r) < 1. For a given risk aversion parameter ; the size of  (1 + r)
10An alternative (identical for our purposes since we only observe data on total sales, PY ), interpretation is
that perectly competitive rms produce with a decreasing-returns-to-scale technology with span-of-control
parameter : All our TFP calculations are identical under this interpretation since our focus is on measures
of Revenue TFP.
7governs the strength of the precautionary savings motive: the more impatient the plant owner
is, the more she relies on external rather than internal nance and the more important
nancing frictions are. Finally, we assume a borrowing constraint similar to that in Kiyotaki
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= (Wt + Bt)
B. Decision rules
It is convenient to rewrite the entrepreneur's problem recursively, noting that net
worth, W, together with the plant's productivity, A, are sucient to describe an individual
state. Hence, the value of the establishment, F(W;A), satises11:
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(AV K1 )
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The rst-order conditions that characterize the optimum are:
D





0) + (1 + r)
where   0 is the multiplier on the borrowing constraint, and










11To keep the notational burden to a minimum, we describe the problem assuming the growth rate of
productivity is 0: The extension to trend growth is straightforward by appropriately detrending all variables
by exp(gt):
8where








If the borrowing constraint does not bind, then  = 0 and RV = RK = 1 + r.
That is, the returns to the two factors are equal to the gross interest rate. In contrast, if




D  < (1 + r); and so the plant hires less capital and variable factors than under
the unconstrained optimum: RV = RK > (1 + r): Importantly, dierences in net worth across
plants with the same productivity will induce dierence in the returns to factors and thus
TFP losses.
Figure 1 plots the decision rules for capital, as a function of the plant's eciency, A,
for two levels of initial plant net worth. The dashed line reects the unconstrained optimum.
Notice how (holding net worth xed) more productive plants are eventually unable to nance
the unconstrained level of capital and as eciency increases, the gap between desired and
actual level of the capital stock increases as well. Hence more productive rms (holding net
worth constant) are more nancially constrained. The decision rules for the variable factor
are similar. The only dierence is that a binding constraint distorts the allocation of capital
relatively more than that of the variable factor (in the sensen that the gap between actual
and desired level of capital is greater). This is because capital is a durable good and hence
more sensitive to variations in the eective rate at which the plant owner borrows.
The fact that more productive plants in our model are more severely constrained may
seem counter-intuitive, especially in light of the results of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The
dierence between our setup and that of Kiyotaki and Moore is that they study the response of
the model economy to an aggregate productivity shock. An aggregate productivity shock, in
the presence of adjustment costs, increases the price of capital and thus relaxes the borrowing
constraint. This latter eect is absent here because we consider idiosyncratic productivity
shocks that have no eect on prices. More generally, one can think of alternative enforcement
scenarios in which the borrowing constraint reects dynamic considerations (e.g., an option
to default). Under such perturbations more productive rms may be less likely to default and
9would also face a less severe borrowing frictions. Our conjecture is that such perturbations
are likely to predict even less misallocation from borrowing frictions as the most productive
rms would be exactly those able to borrow and nance the desired level of capital.
C. TFP losses from misallocation
We next describe how we compute the aggregate (revenue) productivity losses from
factor misallocation in our model economy. Consider the problem of allocating the aggregate
stock of capital K =
R 1
0 Kidi as well as the aggregate stock of the variable factor, V =
R 1
0 Vidi,




















Clearly, the solution to this problem requires that the planner equates the returns to factors




























12That this is the objective of the planner is clear if we adopt the interpretation of perfectly competitive
plants operating with a technology with decreasing returns to scale, : The objective of the planner is the
same however under the alternative interpretation of constant elasticity of substitution preferences over the
dierent varieties of goods. Under such an interpretation the objective of the planner is to maximize the


















Consider next the economy with borrowing frictions. We can rewrite the decision rules













i = 1 + r absent the nance frictions, and !V
i > 1 + r if the borrowing constraint
binds. Similarly, !K
i = r+ absent the nance frictions and greater than r+ if the constraint
binds. With this notation in place, we again write the aggregate revenue in this economy as







Total factor productivity, (Ac)
, now depends on the joint distribution, , of the wedges, !K
i
and !V














Although a closed-form expression for this term is easily available, the expression is too long
for us to include it here. Suces to say that this term decreases in the dispersion of !K
i
and !V
i across plants: Thus, what matters for the TFP losses from nancing frictions is the
dispersion in the shadow cost of funds across entrepreneurs, not its average. The degree of
returns to scale increases the TFP losses from misallocation as well: a greater span-of-control
parameter, ; magnies the losses from nance frictions. In the limit, if returns to scale are
constant, only the most ecient plant should operate and in this case the losses are innitely
large.
This discussion suggests that the model's implications for aggregate TFP critically
depend on its implications for the dispersion in returns to capital,
Ri
Ki and the variable factors,
Ri
Vi across plants. This motivates our empirical strategy of measuring the size of nancing
11frictions by requiring the model to match salient features of the distribution of these objects
in the data. To illustrate our methodology, Figure 2 shows how the returns to capital vary
with a plant's productivity and as a function of  (the parameter governing the strength
of the borrowing constraint). The lower  is, the sooner will a plant hit its borrowing
constraint and the larger the returns to capital will be. As a result, a lower  raises the
gap in returns to capital across productive and unproductive plants and thus causes larger
aggregate productivity losses.
3. Data
In this section we briey discuss the source of the plant-level data we use and discuss
a number of salient features of the data.
A. Data Description
Korea
The data we use are from the Korean Annual Manufacturing Survey, which is collected
by the Korean National Statistical Oce. The survey is conducted every year from 1991 to
1998, except for the year of Industrial Census (1993) for which we supplement the data using
the Census data (which covers all establishments). The survey covers all manufacturing
plants with ve or more workers.
The survey reports information about each plant's total revenue, number of employ-
ees, total wage bill, payments for intermediate inputs (materials), as well as energy use.
The survey also reports the book value of a plant's capital stock, as well as purchases, retire-
ment/sales, and depreciation for land, buildings, machinery and equipment. This information
allows us to construct a measure of plant-level capital using a perpetual inventory method13.
We follow earlier work and focus on buildings, machinery and equipment as our measure of
capital stock. We construct this measure according:
It = PURt   RETt
Kt+1 = Kt   DEPt + It
where It is investment, PURt is purchases and DEPt is the depreciation of capital stock. We
13See e.g. Caballero et al. (1995).
12use a plant's book value of capital to initialize each series. All data (investment, retirements,
depreciation, initial capital stock) is deated using price deators for capital for Korea's
Manufacturing Sector available from the OECD STAN Industrial Database. We dene labor
expenditure as wage and welfare payment to workers. The intermediate inputs reported
in Korean Manufacturing Survey include raw materials, water, fuel, and maintenance. All
revenues and expenditures are deated and correspond to 1991 Korean Won. Finally, we
augment that measure of capital constructed above to include the amount leased by (primarily
smaller) establishments.
We drop observations that are clearly an outcome of coding errors: observations with
negative reported revenue, expenditure of variable inputs, depreciation, capital book value,
and capital purchases. Our nal sample consists of 591;665 plant-year observations over an
eight year period from 1991 to 1998. We mostly focus on the 1991-1996 period, the years
before the nancial crisis, and study the last two years of the crisis in the nal section of this
paper.
Our information about the debt positions of plants in the Manufacturing sector comes
from the Bank of Korea Financial Statement Analysis. This is a survey of all large companies
as well as a stratied random sample of smaller rms. The aggregate debt-to-sales ratio of
rms in this dataset is equal to 0.50. Given that the share of value added in revenue is equal
to roughly 1/3 in our sample, this number corresponds to a Debt-to-GDP ratio of 150%, thus
in line with aggregates for Korea.
Colombia
The data are from the Colombian Industrial Survey and covers the years 1981 to 1991.
The Census collects data on all establishments with more than 10 workers. The Colombian
Manufacturing sector relies primarily on mostly food processing, textiles, apparel and metal
products, and is thus less capital-intensive than its Korean counterpart.
The Colombia Industrial Survey reports detailed information of book value, purchases,
sales, and depreciation of xed assets categorized by building, machinery, and other trans-
portation/oce equipment. This allows us to construct measures of capital stock in a very
similar fashion as for the Korean data described above. We measure labor expenditure as
wage and benets payments to workers. Intermediate inputs include energy, raw material, and
various other industrial expenditures (such as fuels and lubricants, repairs and maintenance).
All revenues and expenditures are denominated in 1981 Pesos.
13After excluding observations that are an obvious outcome of coding error using the
same criteria as in Korean data, we are left with 71;330 plant-year observations for 1981 to
1991. Finally, we use aggregate data on the External Finance to GDP ratio for Colombia:
0.3014, which then translates into a debt-to-sales ratio of 0.10 given the share of value-added
in revenue for the plants in our sample.
B. Plant-level moments and identication
Table 1 presents the moments we will use in order to calibrate the parameters of the
model. We focus on a balanced panel of plants that are in sample from 1991 to 1996 (Korea)
and 1981 to 1991 (Colombia) in order to parameterize the version of the model without plant
turnover.
These plant-level moments are remarkably similar across the two economies. As Table
1 indicates, the capital to sales ratio, which we use to pin down the share of capital, 1 , in
the production function, is equal to 1/3. The ratio of spending on variable inputs (labor and
intermediate inputs, including energy, water, fuels and other expenditure) is equal to 0.72
in Korea, and somewhat higher, 0.80 in Colombia. These moments will help pin down the
degree of returns to scale,  (the inverse of the markup), in the model. All else constant, a
higher ratio of costs to revenue is interpreted by the model as evidence of a smaller markup,
i.e., a higher :
Aggregate (real) revenue grows at 6% per year in Korea and 5% in Colombia in the
respective periods. The ratio of aggregate investment to capital is 20% in Korea and somewhat
smaller, 12% in Colombia. Together, these two sets of moments will pin down the growth
rate of plant-level productivity, g, as well as the rate at which capital depreciates, :
We will pin down the two parameters that govern the persistence and volatility of
productivity shocks by requiring the model to account for the serial correlation of plant-level
revenue, and the standard deviation of revenue growth rates. Notice that establishment-level
sales are fairly persistent in the data: its serial correlation is equal to 0.96 in Korea and 0.99
in Colombia. Large plants thus stay large for long. Revenue is however quite volatile from
one year to another: the standard deviation of its growth rate is equal to 46% in Korea and
29% in Colombia.
The next set of moments we report are the average returns to capital (variable factors)
14Beck et. al. (2000), Moll (2009).
14for plants that expand (lnRit > 0) minus the average returns to capital (variable factors)
for plants that contract (lnRit < 0): As we argue above and also illustrate below in a
set of counterfactual experiments, the model predicts that more severe borrowing frictions
translate into a larger gap in returns to factors across the two groups of plants because
nancing frictions disproportionately aect plants whose productivity has increased and need
to purchase more capital, labor etc. in order to expand their scale of production.
That plants that grow are plants that have been subject to increases in their produc-
tivity is true of course only as long as variation in revenue over time is mostly driven by shocks
to a plant's productivity and not to its net worth or collateral constraint. A rm subject to
an exogenous tightening of the borrowing constraint may be forced to sell capital and it will
contract and simultaneously experience an increase in its return to capital. We show below
however that a model with shocks to the plant's ability to borrow, on their own, accounts
for little of the size distribution of establishments in the data. Therefore most dierences in
plant dynamics, we argue, reect variation in plant-level eciency15, as opposed to shocks to
a rm's net worth or borrowing constraints.
Interestingly, dierences in whether establishments contract or expand have similar
eects on the returns to factors in the two countries we study. Plants that expand have
returns to capital that are on average 27% (Korea) and 30% (Colombia) higher than those
plants that contract. Similarly, the gap in returns to the variable factor across the two types
of establishments are equal to only 3% in both countries.
The last rows of Table 1 report several additional features of the data that we will
use to evaluate the model's predictions. These summarize moments of the size distribution
of establishments which is highly concentrated (e.g. in Korea the top 10% of the plants
account for 85% of the sales), as well as moments that summarize the shape of the tails of the
distribution of revenue growth rates. In particular, a number of plants in the data experience
quite large increases in their revenue (e.g. in Korea 1% of the plants experience increases in
revenue in excess of 3 standard deviations, i.e, in excess of 150%). Since large expansions are
more dicult to nance in the presence of borrowing constraints, we study the implications
of these episodes for the model's predictions for aggregate TFP.
15Given our focus on revenue productivity, shocks to "eciency" reect both productivity (cost), as well
as preference shocks.
154. Quantitative Results
We rst discuss the approach we used to parameterize the model economy, and then
compute the TFP losses from misallocation and conduct a number of robustness experiments.
A. Parametrization
The two parameters that we assign and are constant across countries/experiments are
the parameter governing the curvature of the utility function,  = 2, and the risk-free interest
rate, r = 2%: Both of these are standard parameters in earlier work.
We calibrate the rest of all other parameters (separately for each country) by mini-
mizing the distance between the moments in the model and in the data. The parameters we
calibrate are those described above, in addition to those characterizing the distribution of
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Thus, with probability 1 p the shock to productivity is drawn from a Gaussian distri-
bution with variance 2
", while with probability p that plant experience a large productivity
shock equal to B standard deviations. These infrequent but large bursts in productivity are
necessary for the model to account for the fat upper tails of the distribution of revenue growth
rates in the data.
The moments we target are those numbered 1-11 in Table 1: the plant-level moments
described earlier, as well as the aggregate debt-to-sales ratios in the Manufacturing sector (0.5
in Korea and 0.10 in Colombia). Table 2 reports the two sets of moments in the model, for
both countries: our parametrization allows a fairly good t and matches all of these moments
quite well. In particular, notice that the model accounts well for the relatively large gap
in returns to capital across plants that shrink and expand and the relatively lower gap in
returns to the variable factors. As mentioned above, this is driven by the fact that capital is
a durable good and hence more sensitive to variations in interest rates.
As for the moments we do not explicitly target in our calibration, notice that the model
accounts for the size distribution of plant revenue well. The model matches the unconditional
variance of revenue, as well as the concentration of revenue among the top plants, especially
16for Colombia. We slightly underpredict the amount of concentration among Korean plants
(the top 10% of the plants account for 85% of sales in the data and only 72% in the model,
while the top 20% of the plants account for 92% of sales in the data and only 84% in the
model), but as we show below, this aspect of the model considerably improves once we allow
for plant-level turnover.
Table 3 reports the parameter values, in both Korea and Colombia, that achieve this
t. The share of capital, 1   ; is fairly low, 0.075 in Korea and only 0.04 in Colombia,
reecting that manufacturing in Colombia is less capital-intensive as well as the fairly high
share of intermediate inputs in the manufacturing sector. The return-to-scale parameters is
equal to 0.82 in Korea and 0.87 in Colombia, reecting the relatively higher share of variable
factors in revenue (80% vs. 72%) in Colombia. Both of these numbers are in the neighborhood
of typical estimates of returns to scale (or markups) in the US16.
Productivity grows in both countries at a rate of roughly 5% per year. We estimate
a lower rate of depreciation in Colombia (7%) than in Korea (13.7%), reecting the lower
investment-to-capital ratio in the former.
The serial correlation of productivity shocks is 0.929 in Korea and 0.978 in Colombia,
reecting the more persistent process for revenue in the latter. Shocks to productivity are
more volatile in Korea (" = 0:095) than in Colombia (" = 0:05), given the lower standard
deviation of revenue growth rates. Our conjecture is that these dierences reect the fact
that the Colombian data samples relatively large plants (those with more than 10 workers)
while the Korean data samples some smaller plants (those with 5 workers). Notice also that
in both countries a fairly large proportion of establishments (in excess of 4 %) are subject
to large shocks to their productivity. This is especially true in Korea where the size of the
shock is equal to 4.75 standard deviations.
Finally, we nd that the borrowing constraint is more severe in Colombia than in
Korea. Plants in Korea can borrow up to 61% of their assets, while those in Colombia only
up to 18% of their assets. If these dierences in the borrowing constraint were the sole source
of the dierence in the debt-to-sales ratios in the two economies, the model would predict
much greater dispersion in returns to capital and variable factors in the more nancially
constrained Colombian establishments. This, however, is counterfactual given the evidence
16See, e.g. Basu and Fernald (1995,1997). Atkeson and Kehoe (2007) cite this and other evidence and
argue for a span-of-control parameter equal to 0.85.
17in Table 1. Hence, in addition to nding more severe borrowing constraints in Colombia,
our algorithm concludes that Colombian plants have a stronger precautionary-savings motive
and rely much more on internal nance. Mechanically, this implies an estimate of  (1 + r)
that is greater in Colombia (0.985) than in Korea (0.90)17. Thus, the lower debt positions of
plants in Chile reect, according to our calibration, a combination of more severe borrowing
frictions, but also a stronger precautionary savings motive.
B. Size of borrowing frictions and TFP losses from misallocation
We are now ready to discuss the extent to which establishments are constrained in the













Recall that returns to capital and the variable factor, are equal to RV = RK = (1 + ~ r):We
thus interpret ~ r is the implicit rate at which the plant owner is borrowing (cost of external
funds). If the borrowing constraint does not bind, ~ r = r = 2%. We dene a constrained
plant as one for which ~ r > r and report a number of statistics from the ergodic distribution
of plants in Table 4.
Notice in Table 4 that a larger share of Korean plants borrow (72%) than in Colombia
(42%), reecting the stronger precautionary-savings motive in the latter. Roughly 2/3 of
the plants that borrow in Korea are constrained. In contrast, the vast majority (in excess of
99%) of plants that need external nance in Colombia are constrained as well, given the lower
value of  we estimate. For those plants that are constrained, the median external nance
premium (~ r r) is equal to 4% in both countries. Given the greater volatility of productivity
in Korea, the dispersion in the eective cost of funds for Korean plants is somewhat larger:
the interquartile range of ~ r is equal to 9% (7% in Colombia), while the 90th percentile of ~ r
is 19% (16% in Colombia).
As for the eect of these frictions on allocations, the median plant size is roughly 80%
of that in the unconstrained economy. In this sense, nance frictions have a non-negligible
eect. Most importantly, we nd TFP losses (relative to the unconstrained optimum) equal
17Alternatively, if we x  (1 + r) in the two countries, and allow the risk aversion parameter,  ; to vary,
we nd a higher risk-aversion parameter for Colombia which leads plants to hold less debt in response to the
stronger precautionary savings motive.
18to 1.7% in Korea and 1% in Colombia. Again, the smaller losses in the latter reect a less
volatile process for productivity, in conjuction with our requirement that the model accounts
for the gap in returns to factors across plants that shrink/expand in the two countries.
C. A counterfactual experiment: the role of 
We emphasize that the small TFP losses we nd reect the small gap in returns to
capital and the variable factor across growing/shrinking plants we document in the data for
Colombia and Korea. To see how the model's predictions change if we ignore these features
of the data, we conduct the following counterfactual experiment. We start from the model's
calibration for Korea (the relatively more nancially developed country) and change one
single parameter, , so as to change the debt-to-sales ratio predicted by the model from 0.50
to 0.10 (the value for Colombia). This counterfactual experiment is similar to that performed
in earlier quantitative studies of the role of nancing frictions we cite in the introduction.
The idea is to attribute all variation in the size of the external nance sector across countries
to dierences in the severity of nance frictions alone (as opposed to dierences in, say, the
strength of the precautionary savings motive).
Table 5 reports the results of this counterfactual experiment: we need a value of 
equal to 0.12 in order to render the parameterization of the model for Korea consistent with
a debt-to-sales ratio equal to that in Colombia of 0.10. Notice that in this counterfactual
experiment plants are much more constrained; the median external nance premium much
larger (15% on average vs. 6% earlier); and the model produces much more dispersion in the
eective cost of external funds: 10% of the constrained plants face a shadow cost of capital
in excess of 40%. As a result the median rm size is much smaller (1/2 relative to the
unconstrained case), and the TFP losses from misallocation much greater (8%). These are 8
times greater than those we inferred for the Colombian calibration in which the debt-to-sales
ratio was also equal to 0.10.
The large TFP losses in this counterfactual experiment are driven by the fact that
the model now generates much more dispersion in returns to factors than in the data. The
gap in returns to capital across plants that expand/shrink is now roughly double that in
the Colombian data, while the dierence in returns to the variable factor is now 5 times
larger than that in the Colombian data. It is for this reason that our Colombian calibration
requires a much stronger precautionary savings motive in order to simulataneously match the
dispersion in returns to factors as well as the lower debt positions of the Colombian plants.
19D. Discussion
What accounts for the low TFP losses the model predicts, especially in Colombia were
rms are severely constrained in their ability to borrow externally ( = 0:18)? Two forces
are at play, and we focus on each of these below.
Recall that the losses from misallocation depend on the dispersion in returns to capital
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Thus, although the dispersion in ~ r generates quite a bit of dispersion in the marginal
product of capital (because ~ r and  are of similar magnitude), it generates much less dispersion
in the marginal product of the variable factor (because ~ r is relatively close to 0: even an
external nance premium of 100% would only double the returns to the variable factor in the
model). As a result the TFP losses are quite small given the small share of capital in the
production function.
Why is the dispersion in the cost of external funds fairly small in the model? Why is
a plant that starts small and receives a sequence of good productivity shocks able to quickly
grow out of its borrowing constraint? Recall that plants nance their expenditure with two
sources of funds: external nance (which is constrained), but also with internal nance (net








 + (1   )Kt 1   Bt 1
and is strongly correlated with current productivity as long as At is persistent. Thus, a
plant that becomes productive is quickly accumulating internal funds as higher productivity
translates into higher revenue even for constrained rms. As a result highly productive
plants do not stay constrained for long. This is illustrated in Figure 3 where we report the
20impulse response to a large (2 standard deviations) productivity shock in the counterfactual
experiment we conducted for Korea with  = :12: Notice that the increase in productivity
initially leads the plant to sell capital in order to nance increases in its dividends (the
consumption-smoothing motive), as well as to allow it to hire more of the variable factors.
Eventually however the higher productivity of the plant generates more revenue and the rm's
eective cost of funds quickly decays to its pre-shock level.
This discussion suggests that the persistence of productivity shocks plays an important
role in the plant's ability to quickly grow out of their borrowing constraints. Moll (2009) has
recently argued that plant-level productivity is much less persistent in the data and estimates
a serial correlation parameter ( = 0:79) for the dataset we use (Colombia) that is much
smaller than what we nd ( = 0:98). He argues that our results are very sensitive to the
degree of serial autocorrelation of productivity shocks in the model.
The dierence in the two sets of estimates reect dierences in methodology. Moll
(2009) computes a Solow residual measure of plant productivity using value-added data (we
use revenue) and estimates an AR(1) process for it (which may be subject to a small sample
bias). Given the uncertainty regarding the value of  and the sensitivity of its estimate to
dierences in methodologies; we ask whether our results are indeed sensitive to the value of
this paramater. We do so by recomputing our Colombian calibration and imposing a value for
 equal to 0.79, Moll's estimate for Colombia. We nd that the TFP losses when  = 0:79 are
only double those in the original Colombian calibration (1.9 %), reecting a counterfactually
larger dispersion in returns to factors (e.g. 0.40 for capital vs. 0.30 in the data) and a less
persistent process for plant-level revenue (the serial correlation is 0.89 in the model and 0.99
in the data). We thus conclude that our ndings are not that sensitive to the exact value
for  one employs. We conjecture that the dierence between our results and those of Moll
(2009) reect our estimate of a lower span-of-control parameter for Colombia (0.87). Moll, in
contrast, studies a model with constant returns to scale in which any amount of dispersion
in plant-level returns to factors (in fact the mere co-existence of more than one plant) is very
costly.
5. Additional Experiments
We next gauge the robustness of our results to several perturbations of the model,
including allowing for plant-level turnover, shocks to net worth, and a lower elasticity of
substitution between capital and the variable factor.
21A. Exit and Entry
Given our focus on the amount of misallocation across existing plants (as opposed
to distortions of the exit/entry margin), we assume a constant hazard of plant exit, : A
plant that exits is replaced by a new plant whose productivity is equal to A0, a parameter
we calibrate, and whose net worth is equal to a fraction  of the old plant's net worth. The
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We calibrate the three additional parameters, ,  and A0, in order to match three
additional moments of the Korean unbalanced panel of plants from 1991-1996: the fraction
of young plants (ages 1-5 years); the median dierence in revenue for plants that are young
(1-5 years) vs. plants that are old (6 years and above), as well as the dierence in returns to
capital and the variable factor for young and old plants. Intuitively, A0 governs the median
gap between the size of newly entering and older plants, while  governs the extent to which
entering plants are constrained. The latter parameter is pinned down using information on
the dispersion in returns to factors: the more constrained entering plants are, the larger their
returns to capital and labor. Finally, a higher  generates more plant turnover and thus a
higher proportion of young plants in the sample. We use the latter statistic (as opposed to
the actual degree of turnover in the data), because turnover in our sample may be spurious.
For example, a plant may disappear from the sample simply because it falls below the cuto
of 5 workers, the truncation point of the survey we use.
In addition to these three additional moments of the data, we will calibrate the model
to the entire panel of Korean plants (no longer restricting our focus to a balanced panel),
using all moments we have discussed above and now reported in Table 6 (notice that these
are very similar to those for the balanced panel in Table 1). Unfortunately, we do not have
age information for Colombia so we restrict our analysis to the sample of Korean plants.
Table 6 shows the t of the model. To conserve space, we only focus on the new
moments that are specic to the economy with turnover. Notice that 1/2 of the plants in the
sample are younger than 5 years, both in the model and in the data, and that these plants
are, on average 0.55 log-points smaller than the older plants. The returns to capital are 15%
greater for younger plants in the data (11% in the model) while those to the variable factor
are 1.4% in the data (2.3% in the model). Thus age generates little dispersion in returns to
22factors.
Achieving this t requires an exit hazard of  = 0:131, an initial productivity of
ln(A0) = 0:15, that entering plants start with  = 0:5 of the net worth of the exiting plants, a
rate of time-preferences equal to  (1 + r) = 1 and a borrowing constraint equal to  = 0:58.
The initial productivity of 0.15 is equal to the median productivity across plants in the
population (also 0.15, greater than 0 because of the small fraction of spikes in productivity),
hence entering plants are smaller only because of the borrowing constraints, not because
of lower initial eciency. Also, the rate of time-preference is now greater because of the
assumption that the plant owner loses a fraction of its net-worth with positive probability
upon exit: the latter possibility prevents the owner from relying solely on internal nance
and allows the model to match the debt-to-sales ratio in the data even with  (1 + r) = 1.
Also notice, in Table 6, that the model does a very good job at accounting for the
additional features of the data that were not directly used for calibration. The model accounts
for the concentration of revenue in the largest plants (for example, the largest 10% of the
plants account for 83% of the revenue in the data, 86% in the model), as well as the growth
rates of the young plants (4.3% in the data and 4.9% in the model). Cooley and Quadrini
(2001) show how the growth-rate vs. age relationship varies with the severity of nancing
frictions. That our model matches the speed at which young rms grow is, to us, evidence that
our identication of the strength of nancing frictions using variation in returns to factors is
quite robust.
Does exit and entry increase the degree of misallocation predicted by the model? We
nd that a somewhat greater fraction of plants are constrained now (52% vs. 46% earlier), the
median eective cost of funds for constrained plants is 8% (6%) earlier, and the interquartile
range of ~ r is 0.11% (0.09% earlier). Although somewhater greater, these nancing frictions
do not increase aggregate TFP losses much: eliminating the borrowing constraint would raise
TFP by 1.90% (1.69% earlier). We thus conclude that our results are robust to allowing for
plant-level turnover.
B. Shocks to net worth
Our identication strategy for uncovering the size of borrowing constraints relies on
the assumption that productivity shocks are the main source of establishment-level dynamics.
This is very much in the spirit of Hopenhayn (1992) and the recent work that quanties the
role of nance in generating misallocation. Nevertheless, suppose that shocks to the borrowing
23constraint or the plant's net worth are an important source of movements in plant-level sales.
In this case, rms that are subject to a negative shock to their ability to borrow will have to
contract the amount of resources they hire, and will thus simultaneously increase a drop in
sales and an increase in returns to factors. Thus shocks to the plant's ability to borrow drive
a negative correlation between returns to factors and growth rates, the opposite of the eect
driven by productivity shocks.
We next ask whether this additional countervailing eect is indeed quantitatively im-
portant. We assume shocks to the return's to a given plant's net worth, so that the law of
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where the returns to net worth are log-normally distributed: log  N (0;2
):
We set 2
 = 0:5 which is arguably very large: more than 30% of the plants experience
more than a 50% increase or decrease in their equity holdings and hence their ability to
borrow in any given period. We then shut down productivity shocks: changes in net worth
are the sole source of variation in plant-level revenue. We nd that in this experiment returns
to factors are indeed negatively correlated with growth rates. Plants that expand now have
returns to capital 7% smaller than rms that contract and the dierences in returns to the
variable factor are 1.2%. This parametrization fails however to generate much dispersion in
the size or growth rate of revenue. For example, the standard deviation of changes in revenue
is equal to 0.13 (0.46 in the data). Even more extreme, the unconditional variance of revenue
is 0.016 (2.50) in the data. Absent variation in productivity, the model also generates very
little TFP losses from misallocation, only 0.2%. We hence argue that shocks to the borrowing
constraint alone account for little of the size distribution of plants in the data.
C. Lower elasticity of substitution
We have argued above that one of the reasons the model predicts small TFP losses from
misallocation is the fact that capital is the only factor that is fairly sensitive to variations in
the eective cost of external funds, but its share is too small for distortions along this margin
to produce large eects on misallocation. We now ask whether our results are sensitive to
the unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and the variable factor that we have
24assumed.















where  is the elasticity of substitution between the two factors.
In Table 7 we report results from two experiments, for  = 0:5 and 1.5. We leave all
parameters, except for ; unchanged as the moments we target are insensitive to the value of
. The share parameter, ; is chosen so as to match the ratio of capital to revenue as in the
original analysis. In addition to the moments that relate to the returns to factors, we also
report how the ratio of capital to the variable factor varies across plants that expand/shrink.
We argue below that the latter statistics is informative about the value of :
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Thus, because  < 1, we have that an increase in the cost of borrowing, ~ r, reduces the ratio
of capital to the variable factor. Hence the model predicts that rms that expand have a
relatively smaller capital-variable factor ratio than rms that contract. This dierence in
capital-variable factor ratio depends however on the elasticity of substitution: the lower 
is, the smaller the dierence. In the limit, with a Leontie production function the ratio of
capital to the variable factor is independent of the cost of external nance, ~ r.
Table 7 reports the TFP losses from misallocation for these additional experiments. We
nd that indeed, lower substitutability between factors raises the losses from misallocation.
The eects are quantitatively small however: the TFP losses range from 1.6% when  = 1:5
to 1.77% when  = 0:5: The reason the eect is small is that a smaller elasticity induces a
smaller dispersion in the capital to variable factor ratio. Also notice that a value of  = 1:5 is
most consistent with the -0.30 dierence in the capital to variable factor ratio among plants
that expand/shrink in the data (this gap is equal to -0.20 when  = 1 and -0.10 when  = 0:5).
Thus, if anything, our use of a Cobb-Douglas production function overstates the role of this
mechanism.
256. Korean Financial Crisis
The 1997-1998 Korean nancial crisis provides an important case study against which
to evaluate our model's predictions. The crisis started in January of 1997 with the bankruptcy
of Hanbo steel, one of the largest chaebols, followed by the failure of another steel producer
(Samni group), as well as a number of other chaebols and business groups (including Kia
motors, the third largest automakers in July 1997)18.
The crisis was accompanied by a 5% increase in the country risk premium, a 9%
rise in corporate bond spreads and a 70% exchange rate devaluation19. The latter played an
important role since much of the corporate debt was denominated in dollars: Gilchrist and
Sim (2007) nd that these balance sheet eects account for 50-80% of the drop in investment
spending by Korean rms in the aftermath of the crisis. Finally, utilization-adjusted TFP
dropped 3.3% relative to trend, according to calculations by Benjamin and Meza (2009).
Our goal in this section is to study our model's predictions for the response of TFP in the
Manufacturing sector after the crisis.
Figure 4 reports how the cross-sectional variance of returns to capital and the variable
factor evolves in Korea from 1993 to 1998. We compute returns for the balanced sample of
plants that survive all years and rst demean using each plant's time-series average returns
(for the 91-96 period) before computing, for each year, the cross-sectional variance. The
cross-sectional variance of returns to the two factors increases considerably during the crisis,
by 0.14 (a 55% increase) for capital and 0.006 (a 25% increase) for the variable factor.
We model the crisis as a one-time decrease in all the plant's net worth by 70%. This
drop in net worth is chosen so that the model accounts for the 9% increase in the cost of
external funds (~ r in the model) observed in the data for Korean corporate bonds spreads
following the crisis. In response to this shock, the amount of misallocation in the model
economy increases as well: the variance of returns to capital increases by 0.09 (recall 0.14 in
the data) and the variance of returns to the variable factor increases by 0.006 (0.006 in the
data). Hence our model accounts remarkably well for the increased dispersion in returns to
factors in the data.
Figure 5 reports the response of TFP to the nancial crisis in the model. We nd that
TFP drops by 2% (relative to trend) in the aftermath of the crisis, and the drop is fairly
18See Adelman and Nak (1998) for a detailed description of the crisis.
19Gertler, Gilchrist, Nataluci (2003).
26persistent (1% below trend 3 years after the crisis). The model thus accounts for 60% of the
drop in TFP in Korea reported by Benjamin and Meza (2009). Thus, a nancial crisis of
large proportions produces, both in the model and in the data, a fairly small drop in TFP.
7. Conclusions
We document, using micro-level data for Colombia and Korea, modest variation in re-
turns to factors of production across plants that expand/contract or across young/old plants.
We show that a model of rm dynamics driven solely by shocks to establishment-level e-
ciency, interprets this data as evidence that nancial frictions have a minor role in distorting
resource allocation across productive units. Accordingly, the model we study predicts TFP
losses in the neighborhood of 1-2%. These numbers are much smaller than those reported
in earlier work that focuses mostly on aggregate-level information to pin down the size of
nancing frictions.
We emphasize that ours is not an impossibility result: we do not argue that nancing
frictions on capital accumulation cannot generate large aggregate eciency losses. Indeed, we
show how the model's predictions can vary quite a bit if one ignores micro-level information
and focuses solely on a country's external nance to GDP ratio.
Our focus was, due to data limitations, on a very narrow question: to what extent can
nance frictions distort resource allocations among existing plants. We focus on this question
because we only observe data on returns to factors for plants that are currently operating.
Hence our analysis is silent on whether misallocation plays an important role on the extensive
margin, by preventing talented individuals from joining entrepreneurship, or by distorting the
allocation of resources across sectors, as in the work of Buera and Shin (2008) and Buera,
Kaboski and Shin (2009).
Our results are not evidence that nancing frictions are unimportant. In fact, we nd
that roughly half of the plants in our sample are nancially constrained and face an average
premium on external nance of roughly 5%. Rather, the model's failure to generate TFP
losses stems from the ability of productive establishments to quickly accumulate internal
funds. In the model, a highly productive rm is one that also generates a lot of revenue. This
revenue is used, in turn, to accumulate equity and the productive establishment quicky over-
comes the borrowing constraint. Our calibration predicts that this incentive to accumulate
internal funds is greater for plants in Colombia, the relatively poor country, thus explaining
why the losses from misallocation are small in Colombia despite a very low debt-to-GDP
27ratio.
Finally, we do not interpret our results as evidence against an importank link between
nance and TFP. Our analysis indicates that nancing frictions cause fairly small distortions
in the allocation of factors across plants that dier in the eciency with which they currently
operate. Nevertheless, to the extent to which these frictions distort the adoption20 of newer
and better technologies, their eect on TFP is potentially much greater. An extension of our
analysis along these lines remains an exciting topic for future research.
20We thank Simon Gilchrist for suggesting an extension of our model along these lines.
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30Table 1: Plant-level Facts: Balanced Panel
Korea Colombia
1. aggregate K=R 0.34 0.33
2. aggregate V=R 0.72 0.80
3. ln(R) 0.06 0.05
4. I=K 0.20 0.12
5. corr. ln(Rit);ln(Rit 1) 0.96 0.99























9. 95 % to s.d. ln(R) 1.73 1.59
10. 99 % to s.d. ln(R) 3.17 2.81
11. Debt-to-Sales 0.50 0.10
12. var lnR 2.50 2.96
13. Fraction revenue top 10% plants 0.85 0.72
14. Fraction revenue top 20% plants 0.92 0.86
31Table 2: Moments in Model and Data
Korea Colombia
Data Model Data Model
Used in Calibration
1. aggregate K=R 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33
2. aggregate V=R 0.72 0.72 0.80 0.80
3. ln(R) 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
4. I=K 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.12
5. corr. ln(Rit);ln(Rit 1) 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.99






















0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04
9. 95 % to s.d. ln(R) 1.73 1.72 1.59 1.65
10. 99 % to s.d. ln(R) 3.17 3.27 2.81 2.78
11. Debt-to-Sales 0.50 0.50 0.10 0.10
Additional moments
12. var lnR 2.50 2.57 2.96 3.05
13. Fraction revenue top 10% plants 0.85 0.72 0.72 0.69
14. Fraction revenue top 20% plants 0.92 0.84 0.86 0.82
32Table 3: Parameter values
Korea Colombia
 Variable factor share 0.925 0.960
 Span of control 0.824 0.870
 Depreciation rate 0.137 0.070
g Productivity growth 0.053 0.046
 Persistence productivity 0.929 0.978
" s.d. shocks to productivity 0.095 0.050
p prob. large product. shock 0.041 0.047
B size large product. shock 4.75 2.50
 Borrowing constraint 0.605 0.180
(1 + r) Discount factor 0.897 0.985
33Table 4: Size of nancing frictions and TFP losses from misallocation
Korea Colombia
Fraction borrow 0.72 0.42
Fraction constrained 0.46 0.42
median ~ r if constrained 0.06 0.06
iqr ~ r if constrained 0.09 0.07
90 % ~ r if constrained 0.19 0.16
median plant size 0.84 0.80
TFP losses, %, 1.69 0.99
34Table 5: Eect of varying  only. Korean calibration.






















0.05 0.15 0.03 0.03
Debt-to-Sales 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.10
Fraction borrow 0.72 0.73
Fraction constrained 0.46 0.73
median ~ r if constrained 0.06 0.15
iqr ~ r if constrained 0.09 0.20
90 % ~ r if constrained 0.19 0.42
median plant size 0.84 0.53
TFP losses, %, 1.69 7.92
35Table 6: Economy with plant turnover
Korea, all plants Model
Used in calibration
aggregate K=R 0.33 0.34
aggregate V=R 0.73 0.72
ln(R) 0.07 0.07
corr. ln(Rit);ln(Rit 1) 0.94 0.94























95% to s.d. ln(R) 1.75 1.77
99% to s.d. ln(R) 3.17 3.10
Debt-to-Sales 0.50 0.50
Fraction young 0.51 0.51
ln(R) young -0.55 -0.54
ln(R=K) young 0.15 0.11
ln(R=V ) young 0.014 0.023
Additional moments
 R growth young 0.043 0.049
Fraction revenue top 10% plants 0.83 0.86
Fraction revenue top 20% plants 0.90 0.91
36Table 7: Role of elasticity of substitution between factors

































-0.30 -0.10 -0.20 -0.30
TFP losses, % 1.77 1.69 1.60
37Figure 1: Decision Rules for CapitalFigure 2: Returns to K vs. λFigure 3: Impulse response to 2 s.d. A shock.Figure 4: Dispersion returns during Korean crisisFigure 5: Response of TFP to financial crisis
in model economy